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 The Functional Prerequisites of
 Intentional Communicative Systems
 Joseph N. Cappella
 I. Reason and Law-Like Explanation
 Speculative and behavioral students of communication hâve
 viewed each other with a certain intellectual suspicion from
 the safety of their "humanistic" or "scientific" frames of référ-
 ence. Furthermore, neither group appears to hâve capitalized
 significantly from the insights of the other. This paper proposes
 (a) to examine the assumptions underlying the position char-
 acteristic of each f rame of référence, ( b ) to explore the strengths
 and weaknesses of each position, and (c) to attempt a synthesis
 which will forge a new position for improving the prescriptive,
 evaluative, prédictive, and explanatory power of speculative and
 behavioral inquiry.
 Speculative and behavioral investigations of communication
 focus on a broad category of events involving thè transfer of
 symbolic information, or the justification of choice regarding
 information transfer, or the symbolic transfer of meaning, as
 you will. Goals, too, are roughly équivalent in that both kinds of
 inquiry seek to prescribe, evaluate, predict, and explain the
 effects of various communicative acts. However, the kinds of
 explanations generated by each method differ markedly. In
 behavioral inquiry law-like explanations dominate, whereas in
 speculative rhetorical theory or criticism, justifications or rea-
 son-explanations dominate.
 In generai, any explanation seeks to subsume a given relation-
 ship, assertion, or phenomenon under a more generai relation-
 ship, assertion, or phenomenon which itself needs no further
 explanation or, as Toulmin suggests, which "goes without say-
 ing."1 In law-like explanations not only is the conclusion a
 special case of the major premise, but the major and minor
 premises together entail the conclusion in that the conclusion
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 must follow once given the major and minor premises. This
 is not the case with reason-explanations since the conclusion is
 only made plausible by the major premise and need not follow
 from it. For example, one might explain the prédominance of
 emotional terms in a politicai speech by citing the speaker's in-
 tent to arouse his audience to action. Although the speaker's
 intent makes the nature of the message plausible, in no way can
 we assume that his intent will necessarily lead to an emotional
 message.
 The différences just noted hâve implications, among them
 the fact that the type of explanaüon one sees as appropriate to
 a given System is usually predicated on and derivable from a
 set of assumptions about the implicit nature of the System being
 analyzed. Law-like explanations of communicative behavior,
 for example, treat man as a stimulus-response System; given the
 stimulus-response law and thè appropriate conditions, the re-
 sponse must follow. Now, while a large segment of behavior
 is habituai, unconscious, and unintentional and, therefore, well
 suited to law-like explanations, there exists a second segment
 which is purposive and choice-oriented and, therefore, poorly
 suited to law-like explanation. The first kind of behaviors, char-
 acterized by thè mere passage of the subject from one space-
 time point to another, I shall term "movements," and the sec-
 ond, characterized by conscious and willed choice among alter-
 natives given a goal, I shall term "actions."2 As Toulmin3 has
 argued, the attempt to characterize man's language behavior
 as movement, while useful for scientific reasons, must inevit-
 ably be doomed to such a narrow and restricted conception that
 only relatively insignificant questions can be posed and an-
 swered. On the other hand, the characterization of man's lan-
 guage behavior preeminently as action and only peripherally
 as movement, while increasing the complexity and difficulty of
 investigation, simultaneously broadens the range of posable ques-
 tions.
 The characterization of language behavior as action, that is,
 the conscious and willed choice among alternatives given a goal,
 suggests that understanding the reasons for choices will in-
 crease understanding of language behavior itself. Hence, the
 explanation of significant aspects of language behavior must be
 of the reason variety. Further, understanding the reasons for
 choices is dépendent upon ascertaining the speaker's intent. How-
 ever, there exist some serious drawbacks inhérent in thè tradì-
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 tional method for thè characterizatian of intent. In seeking to
 explain, evaluate, and prescribe spécifie communicative events
 and to predict the effects of those events, rhetorical theorists
 and critics have often sought to ascertain the (non-observable)
 intent of the speaker through évidence derived from his (ob-
 servable) message. But in imputing communicative intent to
 some internai state of the speaker, a state accessible only by
 an inference from the observable message, problems arise due
 to (a) the variability of subjective imputation of intent, (b)
 invalid inferences, and (e) the "true" or "real" intent of the
 speaker. Thus, given the goals of accurate explanation, useful
 prédiction (that is, prédiction which is not posi hoc), and ef-
 fective prescription, the speculative rhetorician finds himself
 committed to either (a) fréquent errors in prédiction or (b)
 académie excursions into post hoc analysis. On the other hand,
 the extreme S-R theorist, in focusing solely on the observable
 (as befits the paradigm of the naturai sciences), shuns any-
 thing so non-observable and non-deterministic as intention. He
 thus finds himself in the equally untenable position of making
 "valid" explanations and accurate prédictions on the least signi-
 ficant aspects of language behavior - the stimulus-response va-
 riety. I have, of course, simplified the characterizations of both
 speculative and behavioral inquiry in order to highlight those
 aspects of each method on which I propose to focus in the
 remainder of this essay.
 II. Predicting the Output of Intentional Systems
 Since the problems of determining intentionality in language
 behavior are of inévitable concern in studying language be-
 havior, I will propose a conceptualization of intent which I
 find useful, powerful, and intuitively appealing. D. C. Bennett
 argues4 that predicting or explaining the output of a System can
 proceed at any of three levels: (a) the physical level, (b) the
 design level, or (e) the intentional level. Consider the example
 of playing chess against a chess-programmed computer and
 trying to predict its moves (thè output). At a physical level,
 knowledge of the circuit diagrams and the laws of atomic
 physics would in principle permit accurate prédictions. How-
 ever, given the enormous complexity of chess playing computers
 and the rather limited intelligence of normal humans, such
 prédiction is out of the question. At a design level, knowledge
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 of thè program instructions governing thè computerà game
 playing would permit accurate prédictions in principle. How-
 ever, with the increased sophistication of programming tech-
 niques and options that prospect would be useful to only a few
 individuals in the world! However, if one assumes that (a) the
 system "possesses" a goal or set of goals (checkmating, protect-
 ing the Queen, etc.), (b) the system "possesses" information
 and a set of constraints on that information defining alternate
 means to the goal (methods of attack and défense, castling for
 protection, etc.), and (c) the criteria for choice among alter-
 natives are in some sensé rational (the alternatives can be
 rank-ordered on a "rational" basis given a goal), then thè out-
 put of the system can be predicted at an intentional level.
 Chess Masters are capable of playing well against computers
 not because they understand atomic physics, nor because they
 hâve studied computer programming. Rather, they treat their
 computer opponents like their human ones, as having goals and
 alternatives to those goals very much like their own and, more
 importantly, with criteria for choice among alternatives which
 are either similar to their own or rational in the sensé of being
 understandable given the goals of chess.
 Bennett's model gives us a set of criteria for predicting and
 explaining thè output of the communicative as well as other
 Systems. The problem facing thè listener in a communicative
 situation is analogous to the problem facing the Chess Master
 in the above example. Since the listener does not have ac-
 cess to thè cognitive space of the speaker but only to his
 message, then understanding and responding to the intent of
 the speaker can only mean understanding and responding to the
 encoded message; which, in turn, implies that the speaker has
 an intent and the message has an intent, and that those in-
 tents need not be identical or even similar. Julius Stone, in
 Legal Systems and Lawyers Reasoning, underlines this prob-
 lem and intimâtes a solution in line with Bennett's while focus-
 ing on the interprétation of judioial précédents:
 The error of substituting author's intention for meaning
 of language is that it ignores thè fact that a written work
 once created acquires a meaning which, though still dé-
 pendent on men's usage, is still independent of its creator's
 motives; and interprétation is precisely a search for this
 meaning. 5
 and
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 . . . even if it were correct here to search for thè author's
 intention, this author - the author legislator - must reason-
 ably have intended that his language should bind ac-
 cording to the community's understanding of it for thè
 time being, rather than some original understanding of
 his own.6
 Thus, judicial Interpreters recognize (a) that a multiplicity of
 meanings can be imputed to a message, and (b) that if there is
 to be any agreement on the author's meaning or intent, some
 norm for interprétation (for example, the community's under-
 standing) of the message must be shared by the Interpreters.
 Stone's community norms for interprétation would become, in
 Bennett's paradigm, the shared rational criteria for choice
 among alternatives. In addition to the shared criteria for choice,
 Bennett contends that "valid" explanation and "accurate" pré-
 diction will resuit only if the goals and means to those goals are
 known and shared by thè behavioral or speculative investigators
 of communication.
 Furthermore, if Bennett's stipulation of three levels of analysis
 is valid for any System, then my initial position on the fittingness
 of reason-explanation to language behavior, to the exclusion of
 law-like explanation, needs to be modified. The basic issue is
 not the logicai impossibility of law-like or stimulus-response
 explanations of language behavior, but rather that the nature
 of the phenomenon is so complex as to defy analysis at the
 physical or design levels. Toulmin supports the point:
 So it would be unreasonable to look for one single mode
 of explanation applicable to all kinds of human action
 and behavior. Rather, we should expect to find varied
 modes of psychological explanation applicable on différ-
 ent levels and in différent situations.7
 The practical issue then becomes, What kinds of questions are
 best suited to inquiry within the intentional framework? Al-
 though it may be possible in principle to présent physical-level
 descriptions of language behavior, both the nature of the phe-
 nomenon and the questions central to understanding it make
 the success of such an endeavor doubtful at this time.
 In turning away from a stimulus-response approach to lan-
 guage behavior and taking up reason-explanations, I have
 sought to set down through Bennett's paradigm a set of condi-
 tions in which explanation and prédiction via reasons will be the
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 most powerful. However, it is necessary to transform the élé-
 ments and relations of Bennett's paradigm specifically to the
 communication situation. The question to be faced next becomes,
 What conditions of meaning and its transfer will the Bennett
 paradigm suggest which will ultimately lead to valid explana-
 tion and accurate prédiction of communicative events?
 III. Meaning as Standardized Usage
 Since any theory of communication or rhetoric must ultimately
 explain the process of exchanging symbolic information, the
 meaning, as well as the intent, of what I choose to convey must
 inevitably be explained either implicitly or explicitly. For this
 purpose, it is possible to distinguish two levels of symbolic in-
 formation: a personal or de facto level, and a social or de jure
 level.8 That is, in categorizing those expériences with symbols
 which are learned in the social arena of interaction, certain
 idiosyncratic connotations and denotations become attached to
 the symbol as part of its de facto meaning. (We will avoid the
 issue of personal symbols for personal expériences.) Because
 of the personalized and unique character of de facto meaning,
 it cannot be accurately communicated to others unless (a) there
 has been a significant overlap of expériences to yield shared sig-
 nificance for thè communicating individuals, or (b) the indi-
 viduals actively attempt to build a shared significance through
 a process of approximation with de jure meanings.
 De jure meaning, one may argue, differs from de facto in
 that two or more individuals hâve adopted a common valuing or
 common understanding for a given symbol or set of symbols.
 Thus, consensus on the naming, attributes, and/ or functions of
 symbols marks de jure meaning. Clearly, de jure meanings are
 readily communicable whereas de facto meanings are at best
 communicable through some process of approximation through
 de jure meaning. Furthermore, thè transfer of symbolic informa-
 tion involves complex combinations of symbols which also have
 meaning différent from thè mere sum of the meanings of the
 individuai symbols. While any one individuai may choose to
 combine symbols according to his whim, he will not do so if
 he wishes to transfer meaning accurately. That is, the combina-
 tions of symbols chosen will adhère to some norms to which the
 individuals have agreed and these norms will indicate (a) which
 combinations are allowed, and (b) what those combinations are
 to count as or mean.
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 Two apparently contradictory facts characterize Symbols and
 symbolic activity: (a) symbols are social or shared as has been
 suggested above, and (b) symbols are flexible with a multitude
 of both de facto and, more importantly, de jure meanings. In
 other words, a given symbol (or combination of symbols) is as-
 sociated with a set of alternative de jure meanings (its range)
 and in the process of determining which alternative from the
 range the other has intended, thè listener seldom checks more
 than a few of his "guesses" with thè speaker. Thus, we are
 faced with explaining how thè accurate transfer of meaning can
 occur with greater than random frequency if we concede the in-
 hérent flexibility of symbols. I propose that for symbols and
 their combinations there exists a set of appropriate, conven-
 tional, and normative symbol-referent associations and symbol
 combinations which are cued by the situation within which com-
 munication takes place. I shall term thèse sets of appropriate
 choices among alternatives, standardized usages. I contend that
 implicit or explicit situational eues reduce the range of de jure
 meanings, thereby increasing thè probability of accurate trans-
 fer of meaning despite the inhérent flexibility of symbols.
 At least two dimensions of the situation need to be cued
 (either by the speaker or the physical environment itself) and
 recognized (by the respondent) for standardized usages ap-
 propriate to the situation to be shared: (a) the System to which
 the standardized usage is indigenous (ghetto dialect, congres-
 sional parlance, legal terminology, etc.), and (b) the function,
 purpose, or goal of the interaction (persuasion, understanding,
 uncertainty réduction, etc.). That is, to attain efficiency and
 accuracy of communication within an interaction, standardized
 usages must develop spontaneously or be developed intentionally.
 However, that postulate présents certain problems. For example,
 consider a conférence of behaviorists and speculative rhetori-
 cians discussing the direction analysis of speech behavior should
 take. If there is to be any degree of understanding, the two
 groups must agrée to a set of standardized usages to govern
 their meeting. They may (a) agrée to use standardized usages
 familiär within the rhetoricians' System, (b) agrée to use stan-
 dardized usages familiär within the behaviorists' System, (c)
 agrée to a neutral System (say, of Cybernetics or General Sys-
 tems' Theory), or (d) agrée to build a new set of standardized
 usages by approximation from existing standardized usages.
 Whatever their choice, there must exist consensus on a set of
 standardized usages appropriate to this meeting.
 Zòo INTENTIONAL COMMUNICATIVE SYSTEMS
 Second, each interaction situation can be viewed as a System
 carrying out some function or set of functions at a given time.
 Each of these functions is more or less necessary to thè main-
 tenance of thè System (thè interaction situation). If certain
 functions fail, the System will disintegrate; if others fail, the
 System may be altered only a little. For example, production
 functions - "getting the job done" - are often the most important
 functions of industriai Systems, complex organizations, business
 meetings, and the like; whereas, in family situations and even
 in some forward-looking complex organizations, maintaining in-
 terpersonal relations is as essential as "getting the job done."
 Now, the relative importance of spécifie functions or goals for
 a system détermines the degree of accuracy required in com-
 munication: the more important thè goal, thè more severe the
 accuracy requirements. In other words, the number of alterna-
 tive de jure meanings defines a range of interprétation for sym-
 bols and their combinations and this set of alternatives is de-
 rived from some existing system of standardized usage. Further-
 more, as the function, purpose, or goal of the interaction is
 cued and recognized by the participants, the range of de jure
 meanings is reduced. But the more crucial the function, pur-
 pose, or goal to the interaction situation, the greater the ré-
 duction in the range of de jure meanings.
 An example may help clarify my point. In operator-directed
 long distance dialing the standardized usages appropriate to
 greeting and terminating transactions between the customer and
 Operator hâve a broad range precisely because the functions of
 greeting and terminating are not at ail crucial to the proper
 functioning of the system. On the other hand, standardized
 usages for encoding and decoding information concerning the
 origin and destination of calls allow very little latitude because
 that information is crucial to the system's functioning. Thus, it
 is quite clear that the standardized usage mechanism is neces-
 sary to explain the better than random frequency of accurate
 transfer of meaning, given the inhérent flexibility of symbols.
 Standardized usage can be viewed as deriving from a psycho-
 logically consistent set of content, procédural, and translative
 rules. A rule is a prescription for action consisting of: (a) a pro-
 tasis indicating the situations in which the rule is applicable and
 (b) an apodosis indicating the action which ought to, may, or
 must be performed.9 If situation X develops (protasis), then Y
 ought to follow (apodosis). Just as numerous rules for chess
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 playing form thè standardized usage for chess situations, nu-
 merous rules governing communicative situations form the stan-
 dardized usages for those communicative situations.
 Content rules guide choice among alternative symbols ap-
 propriate to différent situations and to the goals of those situa-
 tions. Thus, a concept capable of being understood if com-
 municated in any of several différent messages will have the
 greatest chance of accurate transmission when communicated
 in the message style appropriate to a spécifie situation and func-
 tion. Translative rules indicate what various symbols are to conni
 as or mean, and this definitional process may differ from situa-
 tion to situation for the same symbol. Thus, highly flexible
 symbols with broad ranges of de jure meanings will have those
 ranges reduced by translative rules governing the particular
 symbols in differing situations. Procédural rules guide and gov-
 ern the organization of symbols in given situations. A set of
 procédural rules called standard English grammar govern al-
 lowable combinations of symbols in a situation such as "writ-
 ing for a scholarly journal." However, procédural rules are not
 made up solely of standard grammatical norms, since it is often
 appropriate in certain situations to invoke procédural rules that
 violate standard grammatical norms in order to achieve maximal
 understanding or effect.
 Before turning to the task of linking standardized usage with
 prédiction and explanation of language behavior at the inten-
 tional level, it may be useful to summarize the preceding dis-
 cussion of standardized usage. In functioning and communicat-
 ing in a number of différent Systems, individuals acquire several
 standardized usages, each of which has been developed by the
 particular System for its own ends. In the process of inter-
 acting with others and interpreting their messages in many
 différent situations problems with compétition among thèse
 standardized usages could arise; that is, symbols are flexible and
 that flexibility can be an obstacle to accurate meaning transfer.
 Also, each interactive situation has a purpose or goal which is
 more or less important to maintaining the interactive situation
 and which, in turn, directly alters the allowed flexibility or range
 of the symbols used. Thus, in order for there to be accurate
 transfer of meaning, a standardized usage must be called into
 opération to govern both encoding and interprétation. Further,
 in order for the same standardized usage to be guiding the
 choices of ail participants in the situation, the Communicator
 must eue his listeners to the function or purpose of this inter-
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 action and the System to which the standardized usage he has
 chosen is indigenous.* By now thè link between standardized
 usage and prédiction and explanation at the intentional level
 should be manifesting itself, so let us turn to the task of f ormal-
 izing thè link.
 IV. The Functional Prerequisites for thè Accurate
 Transfer of Meaning
 The functional prerequisites of a communicative System can be
 defined as that set of conditions - relationships, structures, ranges
 of variables, etc. - which must be met in order that the sys-
 tem exist. In other words, the functional prerequisites are
 the necessary conditions for a System to achieve a specified goal
 state. Although any number of goals can be specified for com-
 municative Systems or situations (e.g., understanding, persua-
 sion, uncertainty réduction, motivation to action), it is clear
 that none of thèse goals is achievable without thè accurate trans-
 mission of symbolic meaning as a necessary condition. I hâve
 ohosen to focus on communicative Systems that require the
 maintenance of a goal-state which is thè accurate transmission
 of symbolic meaning. By taking such a choice, we focus directly
 on that set of conditions necessary to explain, predici, evaluate,
 or prescribe effective messages.
 The following are, on this view, the functional prerequisites
 for thè accurate transmission of meaning in a communicative
 situation:
 A. There must exist minimal consensus among individuals
 within the situation on thè basic indicators of understanding and
 lack of understanding; for example, nodding and shaking the
 head.
 B. The récipients of a message must recognize that the mes-
 sage is directed to them.
 C. The récipients must recognize that the Communicator in-
 tends to produce some effect; at a minimum, the intended ef-
 fect is understanding.
 D. There must exist a stable set of standardized usages ap-
 proximately governing
 * The interactive situation may hâve developed its own standardized usage
 and hence, there would be no other System to eue; rather, the présent situa-
 tion would eue its own standardized usage.
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 1. from thè speaker's side:
 (a) symbol choices suited to the System and task, and
 (b) symbol-combination choices suited to the System
 and task;
 2. from the récipients' side:
 (a) referent-choice for the transmitted symbol, given
 the System and task, and
 (b) referent-choice for combining the transmitted
 Symbols, given the System and task.
 (The concept of standardized usage is normative or conven-
 tional and, hence, implies that erroneous (nonstandard) choices
 from thè set of alternatives are possible, recognizable, and
 remediable by others sharing that standardized usage. That is,
 sanctions, in their broadest sensé, are imposed for déviations
 from consensual positions. )
 E. There must be a set of implicit or explicit (verbalized)
 eues indicating at a minimum:
 1. the System from which the standardized usages are
 chosen, and
 2. the functional purpose or task of the interactive
 situation.
 F. There must be a consensus among the Communicator and
 listeners on the set of alternatives available for message con-
 struction and those available for message interprétation.
 To establish the above conditions as necessary for thè ac-
 curate transfer of meaning, one need demonstrate only that ac-
 curate transfer of meaning is impossible (or at least unlikely)
 in the absence of one of the conditions. That is, piA p2A . . .Λ
 P6 are necessary for q, if ^ pt, i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, implies ~ q.
 A. Without minimal consensus on the indicators of under-
 standing, accurate feedback becomes an impossibility. Without
 that minimal feedback, an individuai cannot know if he is tap-
 ping a set of standardized usages which are shared with his
 listener, and accuracy becomes a random phenomenon at best.
 B. The necessity of recognizing thè "directedness" of a mes-
 sage becomes clear in light of conditions C and E. If the im-
 portance of eues for standardized usages (E) and of minimal
 consensus on intended effects ( C ) is granted, then one must also
 grant that the probability of thèse eues and intended effects
 being recognized decreases dramatically when récipients of mes-
 sages are unaware of their rôles as récipients. John Searle backs
 the position:
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 If I am trying to tell someone something, then ( assuming
 certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes
 that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what
 it is I am trying to tell him, I hâve succeeded in telling
 it to him. Furthermore, unless he recognizes that I am
 trying to tell him something and what I am trying to tell
 him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him.10
 Conditions C, D, E, and F are Searle's "certain conditions."
 C. If Bennett's analysis for accurate prédiction and valid ex-
 planation of output at the intentional level is applied to pré-
 diction and explanation of the message-output of communication
 situations, then the individuals in those situations must possess
 and share a goal or set of goals. Although there can be numer-
 ous such intended effects on the part of a speaker, the speaker
 must at least attempt to be understood. Without that minimal
 intended effect or minimal shared goal, the listeners could
 never ascertain the intended meaning of a message because the
 possibility of déception and purposeful misdirection would con-
 found the listener's attempts to interpret. In Bennett's language,
 the communicator-listener System would no longer be "rational."
 D and E. Throughout this discussion the need for a shared
 perspective concerning the construction and interprétation of
 messages has been emphasized. Without such consensus, a sym-
 bol or combination of symbols, X, could be transmitted, but if
 both persons, Px and P2, were asked what the symbol(s)
 meant and asked to predict what the other meant by X, we
 would expect only random accuracy between Pi's meaning and
 P2's prédiction of F^s meaning. However, the resolution of the
 problem is more complex than merely achieving consensus on
 the meaning of a symbol.
 The flexibility of symbols implies not only that a given symbol
 has a range of alternative interprétations as a function of the
 situation, but (a) that the same concept can be encoded dif-
 ferently in différent situations with identical interprétations
 and (b) that the same concept can be encoded differently in
 the same situation with differing interprétations. For example,
 politicai campaign strategists often gear the présentation of their
 oandidate's position on a key issue to the standards of interpréta-
 tion of varying geographical localities - in line with (a) and (b)
 above.
 As suggested earlier, if the intent of the speaker is to be
 correctly predicted through his speech, then the speaker and
 listener must share the criteria for choice among alternatives.
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 That is, each must be cognizant of the normative or conven-
 tional choices. In cuing the System of standardized usages and
 thè function or task of the interactive situation, the alternatives
 generated by flexibility of Symbols are altered since (a) the sys-
 tem-cue* calls into play the standardized usages which are con-
 ventional to that interactive situation, (b) the functional eue
 further reduces the alternatives to a subset of the initial set of
 alternatives defined by the standardized usage and called into
 opération by the system-cue, and (c) the importance of the
 function to the interactive situation further narrows the range
 of alternative encodings and interprétations so that the influence
 of personal style is minimized. If there were no mechanism for
 reducing the staggering number of alternatives generated by the
 flexibility of Symbols, the probability of accurate transfer of
 meaning would be very low indeed. The concept of standard-
 ized usage identifies such a mechanism.
 In Bennett's language, the function (task or purpose) of the
 interactive situation, the importance of that function to the in-
 teractive situation, and the System from which the standardized
 usage is derived constitute together thè set of constraints which
 impose restrictions on the alternatives from which the listener
 will choose his interprétation. The normative or conventional
 choices, which are thè standardized usages themselves, are
 nothing more than the "rational" criteria for choiee which must
 be shared by thè speculative or behavioral investigators of the
 communicative process if their prescriptions, évaluations, pré-
 dictions, and explanations are to be valid and useful.
 F. In light of the discussion of D and E above, consensus
 on the set of alternatives available for encoding and interpreting
 is imperative. However, an example from Ashby11 may make
 the point clearer. Consider two kidnapped individuals who are
 permitted to send one message each to their loved ones. The
 first is allowed to send one of the following messages:
 I am well
 I am sick
 I am dying,
 and chooses the first. The second is allowed only one alterna-
 tive: I am well. Without knowledge of the alternatives avail-
 able to each, the récipients of the messages are likely to con-
 * That is, the System of usage to which the current standardized usage is
 indigenous.
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 elude that both are well, whereas knowledge of the alternatives
 available to each would lead to vastly différent conclusions.
 The notion that what is not said is just as important as what is
 said takes on a more precise meaning in this framework.
 Let us now consider the implications of this formalization
 for behavioral and speculative investigations of communication.
 V. Some Implications for the Investigation of Communication
 A. Exphnations are normative or conventional rather than
 hw-like. Within the paradigm presented above both behavioral
 and speculative students of communication must prescribe, pre-
 dict, evaluate, and explain based on thè set of norms or con-
 ventions (i.e., standardized usages) which are peculiar to the
 interactive situation in question. Furthermore, while we hâve
 suggested that law-like explanations may be inappropriate for
 speech acts, we hâve in no way admitted that the application of
 law-like explanations to communicative acts is logically im-
 possible. It might be argued that because explanations of in-
 tention (or explanations by reasons) are non-contingent, they
 cannot logically be said to cause the actions (e.g., speech be-
 haviors) that follow and, hence, explanations of intention can-
 not admit of prédiction and control whereas law-like, causal
 explanations are suited to prédiction and control. Such a position
 is extreme and needs modification. The argument in favor of
 law-like, causal explanation centers predominantly on the con-
 tingency of causes as opposed to the non-contingency of inten-
 tions or reasons. However, if I know that a politician intends to
 win my vote, not only will his actions in the past and présent
 be befcter understood, but the ranges of his alternative actions
 in the future are reduced, thereby increasing my chances of pre-
 dicting his actions.12 With regard to speech acts: if I assume
 that the speaker always intends that I understand his message,
 then I reduce the range of alternative means he seems likely
 to employ to achieve that end. Furthermore, the systemic and
 functional eues that the speaker provides further reduce alterna-
 tives and, thus, increase my prédictive and explanatory power.
 Clearly, explanations of intentions are not as powerful pre-
 dictors as causal or law-like explanations. Under explanations of
 intention, the action (or conclusion for the syllogism) is not en-
 tailed by the major and minor premises but only made more
 or less probable by them. The analysis of sections II through
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 IV above has indicateci that set of conditions which must occur
 to achieve maximum predictability of thè meaning of a mes-
 sage while maintaining the identity of explanation by reason.
 I have also argued that the logic of such explanation seems
 well suited to the logic of language behavior, whereas the logic
 of law-like explanation seems suited to those aspects of lan-
 guage behavior of only peripheral interest.
 B. Standardized usages must be discovered rather than im-
 posed. Most inquiry which has as its goal the establishment of
 law-like relationships seeks to impose on the phenomena under
 study the most parsimonious and predictively powerful law that
 intuitive genius permits. The work of Kepler on planetary orbits
 and that of Bohr on atomic physics are excellent examples of
 this technique. This process of imposing form or pattern on
 phenomena is also exemplified in the wave-particle conceptions
 of electromagnetic radiation. But it is important to notice that
 while each of thèse théories of light conceptualizes the phe-
 nomenon very differently, thè physical laws or relationships gov-
 erning electromagnetic theory do not change as a resuit of
 différent impositions of pattern. In other words, the logic of
 naturai phenomena is such that its "reality" or patternedness
 can be imposed by the investigatar without destroying the logic
 of the phenomena.
 Such a state of affairs is probably not trae of social phenomena
 in generai,13 and it is certainly not true of communicative
 phenomena as I have conceived them. The imposition of form
 on phenomena, when they are normative, convenüonal, bound
 to situations, and bound to the unstable shared perspectives of
 individuals, is at least inappropriate and ineffectuai and, prob-
 ably, impossible. In characterizing communicative behavior in
 terms of standardized usages we are in effect arguing that the
 imposition of form or structure by speculative or behavioral in-
 vestigators is not congruent with the logic of the phenomena.
 The logic of normative criteria for choice (standardized usage)
 is such that it émerges from an interactive situation through the
 agreement of participants to share a common perspective in
 order to achieve some goal. Hence, in investigation, standardized
 usages must be discovered rather than imposed14 if the investi-
 gator's prédictions are to be accurate and his explanations valid.
 C. Prescriptions for and évaluations of communication must
 be situation bound and rule governed. The previous discussion
 has some implications for setting down prescriptions for effective
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 construction of messages. First, regardless of the speaker's other
 pnrposes, prescription will assume that he seeks to be under-
 stood by his audience. Second, the speaker would be enjoined
 to be audience-centered by tapping a standardized usage famil-
 iär to his audience. Thirdly, the encoding choices made by the
 speaker will be seen as constrained by the situation. Lastly, pre-
 scriptions, themselves, will be seen as normative, conventional
 and, most importantly, discoverable.
 The particular standardized usage adopted in any communi-
 cative interaction provides insight into pragmatic, aesthetic, and
 ethical évaluations. For example, a speaker cognizant of the most
 effective standardized usage for an existing situation may refuse
 for ethical reasons to adopt that standardized usage and so suf-
 fer the conséquences - lack of success. In other words, standard-
 ized usages are thè appropriate, normative, and expected en-
 coding choices in a situation given a goal; adhérence to or dévia-
 tion from those usages provides information to both a rhetorical
 critic and the audience. That information can be used to evalu-
 ate the pragmatic efficacy, the ethics of choice, and the aesthetic
 form of the message.
 VI. Summary
 I hâve attempted to investigate the assumptions underlying the
 law-like explanations of behaviorists and the reason-explana-
 tions of speculative investigators as applied to language be-
 havior. I hâve hoped to point out the weaknesses of both posi-
 tions and to forge a new position by stipulating the conditions
 under which the prédictive power of reason-explanations is
 maximal. A set of mechanisms necessary for thè accurate trans-
 fer of meaning in interactive situations has been posited and de-
 scribed, and the implications of my analysis for prescription,
 évaluation, explanation, and prédiction of communicative acts
 hâve been summarized.
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